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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates credit risk management in Nordic commercial banks and its effect on 
profitability. Two determinants of credit risk are chosen according to relevant literature, 
namely loan loss provision ratio and capital adequacy ratio. Thirteen banks in total are then 
investigated across the 16 year time frame from 2000-2015. The results seek to address two 
essential questions. Firstly, it seeks to capture the relation between credit risk management 
and profitability of Nordic commercial banks in the full data sample. Loan loss provision 
ratio is found to have negative effect on the performance of banks, while capital adequacy 
ratio presents mixed results. Second part of the thesis focuses on the financial crisis 
component, most notably its impact on the change in credit risk management. It is shown that 
macroeconomic environment plays a bigger role in the decrease in profitability after the 
financial crisis than credit risk management does. 
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1. Introduction 
The past decades presented one of the most turbulent times for the banking industry. The 
primary objective of banks is to provide loans as it captures a large part of their income. The 
issue occurs when debtors cannot repay their loans, or in the worst case, these loans go 
default. It then depends on the financial situation of banks how to handle large default rates. 
In essence, pressure is on management to keep default rates low and be financially strong, in 
other words having a solid credit risk management. This leads to an assumption that better 
credit risk management should be advantageous for banks‟ performance. Nevertheless, 
findings on the effects of credit risk management profitability of banks widely differ and 
establishing such relationship has been more difficult than expected for many scholars.  
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the effect of credit risk indicators on profitability of 
commercial banks and compare how this relationship developed since the financial crisis. 
Researchers studying this topic either focus on the large market, mostly US and Europe, or 
small countries, mostly situated in Africa. One of the pioneers in CRM papers was Berger 
(1995) who studied US banks in 1980s. He found credit risk management, measured by 
capital adequacy ratio, to be positively related to return on equity. Erdinç and Gurov (2016) 
also examined a rather large market, more specifically European Union. Their study found 
positive effect of credit risk management not only on profitability but also on solvency of 
banks. Mixed results were provided by study conducted for UK commercial banks by 
Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras (2005). According to their research, loan loss provision ratio 
has a positive and significant impact on net interest margin while having negative impact on 
ROAA. Studies focusing on smaller markets also possess contradicting results. Kithinji 
(2010) conducted a research on Kenyan banks and determined a neutral effect of CRM on 
banks‟ performance meaning profits were not affected by the increase in credit risk. In 
contrary, completely different result was provided by Noman, Pervin and Chowdhury (2015) 
who in their study examined commercial banks in Bangladesh.  Their results showed a 
negative and significant association between CAR and ROE. 
To the extent of my knowledge, no such research has focused on the Nordic market. Bearing 
this in mind, it is of utmost interest to determine if and to what extent is performance of 
Nordic commercial banks susceptible to their credit risk management. As such, this thesis 
aims to fill the gap in the relevant literature not only in the market sample but also in the 
methodology of the research. While some studies omit some credit risk indicators or some 
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control variables, I will try to integrate all relevant measurements for the successful results.  
In this manner, the relationship between credit risk indicators and profitability measures will 
have been established by the end of this thesis. I further contribute to this research area by 
comparing how this relationship has changed from pre-crisis period to a post-crisis period. 
No study has conducted such approach to the extent of my knowledge. The beneficiaries of 
such study can be managers, banks and regulatory institutions. More than that, by evaluating 
impact of regulations on profitability of banks, the results can determine if much more 
regulated banking sector can decrease commercial banks‟ profitability. Taking into account 
that Nordic market has produced the lowest default rates in Europe it will be interesting to 
evaluate how the results compare to other larger and smaller markets. 
This paper is divided into several sections. Section 2 will describe background of the general 
topic as well as overall situation in the banking industry after the financial crisis. It will then 
focus on the development of the Nordic banking sector, more specifically non-performing 
assets distribution across Nordic banks compared to the rest of Europe. The last part will 
specify main regulations that have been put in place and are a big factor in the banking 
development. The following section will address relevant academic articles in two instances. 
First, the importance of credit risk management will be discussed from the overall 
perspective. Secondly, variety of studies with a specific focus on profitability and credit risk 
management will be discussed in depth. Section 4 will focus on the regression itself with the 
emphasis on the data collection, choice of variables, and methods of the model. Thorough 
analysis of all empirical results will be captured and discussion will also be provided.  Last 
section will cover conclusion focusing on the explanations of the whole thesis, contribution to 
the topic and possible further research to be implemented. 
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2. Background of the Banking Sector 
This section will provide an overview of the banking sector in the post-crisis period. To 
specify the market of this thesis, history and characteristics of Nordic banking industry will 
be thoroughly described. Last part of this section serves as an insight to current state of banks 
as it specifies regulations that have been put in place in the last decades.  
2.1 Banking Sector after Crisis 
The introduction part has outlined some issues the banking sector has experienced after the 
financial crisis had started. Few consequences that the lay public is mostly familiar with are 
worsened available credit to consumers, frozen lending, and defaulted loans. This study will 
look closely on the last one mentioned and that is credit risk management. The most widely 
used proxy for credit risk management is the percentage of non-performing loans in banks‟ 
portfolios. To get a little perspective behind the issue, the post crisis numbers (of NPL ratio) 
in two big economies shall be compared.  
Figure 1: Evolution of nonperforming loans in EU and US (Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 2016) 
This figure present trend analysis of nonperforming loans and its difference between two large markets: USA 
and EU. The time frame of the graph is from 2005-2015 while the significant point is between 2008 and 2009 as 
it demonstrates the financial crisis.   
 
Figure 1 shows the trend of non-performing loans from 2006 to 2014 in two developed 
economies- Euro area and the United States. Both economic areas were not able to slow 
down the increasing trend from 2006 to 2009. From that point on, however, both areas went 
the opposite direction. While 2009 was a turning point for the United States and NPLR has 
been decreasing each year since, the Euro area was experiencing a different situation. It looks 
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worrisome as this trend in Europe continued well after the crisis and the recession. This trend 
has changed in the recent past as the average rate of non-performing loans for Euro area was 
5.9% as of September 2015. At the same time when compared to other major developed 
countries, both Japan and the US had their ratio of NPL lower than 2% at the end of 2015 
(Economic Governance Support Unit, 2016). 
Based on the previous analysis, disparity of defaulted loans in the world economy is 
undeniable. Looking into the Euro area state by state, it is surprising how the amount of NPLs 
cluster in different regions. As demonstrated in figure 2 below, the dispersion of NPLR 
among EU countries is high, especially when comparing southern and northern parts. Not 
even considering Greece and Cyprus which had their own issues, the southern region 
consisting of Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Portugal reported NPLR above 10%. 
On the other hand, Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) report ratio below 
4% which is comparable to those of other major developed countries. This seems as an 
interesting paradox which will be analyzed through in the next sections as this thesis focuses 
on Scandinavian banks. It will be discussed why is the NPLR so small in aforementioned 
countries and also what impact it has on profitability on the commercial banks (Economic 
Governance Support Unit, 2016). 
Figure 2: Distribution of loan losses in EU (Economic Governance Support 
Unit, 2016) 
This figure presents the distribution of nonperforming loans across countries in EU. It shall signify the disparity 
across regions, especially south and north areas.  
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2.2 Recent History of Scandinavian Banking Sector 
As touched upon in the previous section, different countries across EU perform differently in 
terms of credit risk management. Nordic sector is very homogenous in terms of NPLR having 
the lowest ratios in all of Europe. Thus it is of great importance to demonstrate policies and 
background of the Nordic banking history. 
Nordic sector comprises of four countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. All of 
these countries but Denmark experienced a severe banking crisis in the early 1990‟s. 
Especially loan losses of these countries had increased rapidly in a short period of time, as 
shown in the table 1 below. The whole issue started with the deregulation of the banking 
sector which led to a rapid expansion in credit. Finland and to some extent Sweden even dealt 
with huge capital inflows due to the interest rates being higher than in neighboring countries. 
This led to an increase in information asymmetry and the impact on defaulted loans was 
substantial, as shown in table 1. Regulations were, on the other hand, much stricter for 
Danish banks than for those in other Nordic countries leading to less information asymmetry. 
Therefore Denmark can be excluded from the rest of the Nordic group for this specific 
banking crisis (Honkapohja, 2009). 
Table 1: Loan losses in Scandinavian banks in the early 1990’s (Anderson, 
2009) 
This table describes development of nonperforming loans in Nordic banking sector during the crisis period.  
 
Country 1989 (1987 for Norway) 1992 (1991 for Norway) 
Finland 0.5 % 4.7% 
Sweden 0.3% 7% 
Norway 0.7% 6% 
 
According to Anderson (2009), the way with which this crisis was handled should be among 
the most successful resolutions in history. Honkapohja (2009) selects three crucial aspects 
that were behind this resolution. First, creating a crisis resolution agency such as 
Bankstödsnämnden BSN in Sweden provided same opportunities for all banks to receive 
public support. Secondly, restructuring was achieved via mergers and acquisitions, mostly in 
Norway and Finland. This strategy succeeded in  terms of troubled banks being merged into 
healthier banks and thus preventing liquidations of those banks. Third, transparency of 
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support actions were crucial in a public eye. For instance, supporting both debt-holders and 
equity holders was of utmost importance, although debt-holders were taken care of first.  
 2.3 Characteristics of Scandinavian Banking Sector 
The Nordic 4 are through its shared history a very close group with similar economic, 
political and social profile. Agarwal et al. (2013) describes the „Nordic model‟ as their 
common approach focusing on financial openness and improved trade.  
Since many positive similarities can be found among these 4 countries, same notion should 
apply to risks as well. First, although financial openness providing benefits for the country, 
spillovers coming from such openness can be harmful to a large extent. Especially in case 
some shock or crisis hits, it might be a suspect to spread across banks easily. Furthermore, 
risks are mostly concentrated in one area, Sweden. This is due to the fact that most large 
banks in the region have parent bank residing in Sweden. For instance, subsidiaries of 
Swedish bank Nordea which are located in Finland and Denmark are both larger in size than 
their parent bank in Sweden (Agarwal et al., 2013). 
Second risk is also related to crisis but now it regards the potential severity of it due to large 
size of banks. Larger banking system can be seen in the amount of publicly-listed assets of 
banks. In Nordic region, these types of assets are on average almost 400 percent of GDP. As 
a consequence, the banking sector can be vulnerable and exploited due to its size (Agarwal et 
al., 2013). 
Another type of risk common across these 4 countries is the certain type of funding which 
takes places across Scandinavian banks. This type of funding is a wholesale funding which 
again can be very beneficial if used under the stable conditions but due to the intra- linkage of 
Nordic economies can be harmful as well (Agarwal et al., 2013). The most common source of 
funding for banks is retail deposits which is long-term in its nature, while wholesale funding 
is usually short-term oriented. This combination can in times of credit crunch be devastating 
for banks. As Nordic banks are heavily reliant on wholesale funding, it increases their risk 
overall (Brown, 2017). Based on the analysis of the risks shared in the Nordic region it is 
clear banks in these 4 countries are very interconnected and share common risks which 
supports the idea to analyze this region as a whole. 
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 2.4 Regulation of the Banking Sector 
The introduction of the thesis has outlined types of risks banks have to face regularly. These 
risks, however, have to be regulated either internally by banks or externally by institutions 
with the power to do so. First of such regulations was done to ensure the stability of the 
banking sector, it was labeled as Basel Capital Accord (Basel I). Its main focus was to set a 
limit for the amount of capital the banks were supposed to keep in their reserves. The ratio of 
this minimum capital compared to risk-weighted assets was set to be at least 8%. This 
regulatory measurement basically forced banks to cover their risks with the funds they have 
and not with what they do not have. However, the definition of the own fund was not that 
clear which was later specified by the introduction of Basel II. The Basel II is composed of 
three significant pillars which are highlighted in table 2. 
Table 2: Basel II Pillars (Bakicaol et al., 2017) 
This table describes biggest changes required by Basel II accords. They are organized into three pillars for 
a better comprehension.   
 
 
Under Basel II, the minimal capital requirement remains unchanged but the way of 
calculating risk- weighted assets is slightly adjusted. This is highlighted in table 3 as the 
calculation of credit risk presents the most distinguished change since Basel I.  Basel II 
distinguishes three methods for a credit risk measurement. The first and the least 
sophisticated is the standardized approach (STA). It does not require banks to assess risks of 
their portfolio on their own. The other method is based on internal ratings; the Internal 
Rating- Based (IRB) approach which allows banks to use their own internal ratings to assess 
risk. Compared to STA, banks can save capital and use it for other business activities making 
this approach very appealing to bank managers. There are two ways to use the IRB: the basic 
and advanced approach. They differ in the way that weights are assigned to capital 
requirements and to risk. 
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Table 3: Capital ratio under Basel II (Roger & Ferguson, 2003) 
This table outlines biggest changes in the calculation of minimum capital ratio as required by Basel II Accords.  
 
 
 
That is where Basel III accord comes to place. Its main focus is on capital requirements for 
banks as well as stating new rules to prevent another crisis. While it is considered a 
completely separate accord in numerical order, this third Basel continues on the idea of Basel 
II with much more focus on capital ratios and its stricter calculations. (Feess & Hege, 2012). 
Hull (2015) in his book identified six essential parts of Basel III: capital definition and 
requirements, capital conservation buffer, countercyclical buffer, leverage ratio, liquidity 
ratio, counterparty credit risk. 
As mentioned before, the first part regarding capital requirements is the most distinctive one. 
The definition of total capital has been changed as it must include Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
Tier 1 capital must include common equity and additional Tier 1 capital and in total Tier 1 
must be at least 6% of risk-weighted-asset constantly. Total capital (Tier 1+ Tier 2) must be 
at least 8% of risk-weighted-assets at all times (Hull, 2015). 
Second part of the new Basel accord is established for periods of stress. To be able to survive 
during these periods, banks should accumulate capital conservation outside of stressful 
periods.  On the other hand, countercyclical buffer aims for banks to take macro- financial 
aspects into consideration when setting capital requirements. To prevent the accumulation of 
leverage in the banking industry as it happened during the crisis, Basel III introduces non-risk 
based leverage ratio. To ensure banks would have enough liquidity for 30 days of significant 
stress period, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio are introduced. The last part 
of the third Basel is established in case of default by the counterparty and reduction of 
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counterparty credit risk (BCBS, 2011). It is essential to note all these parts of Basel III should 
and are being implemented from January 2014 until 2018 (Vlad, 2016). 
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3. Literature Review 
While the preceding paragraphs were to highlight key changes in the banking sector, the 
following section narrows it down to a more specific topic. The most relevant articles to date 
relating to CRM overall, its relationship with efficiency, profitability, leverage, etc. will be 
investigated thoroughly. This section in turn serves as a bridge between two pillars providing 
academic sense behind the topic, its results and impact on future research. In addition, the 
bundle of such literature leads to certain expectations for the outcomes of this thesis making 
it comparative across various articles. More than anything, variety of CRM articles can 
provide such a needed basis for an inexperienced reader who may not be familiar with the 
banking sector, for instance. Ultimately, providing not only results but also holes in the 
existing articles justifies the need and purpose for thesis such as this one. 
3.1 Importance of credit risk management 
Commercial banks, just like any other institution, battle with different types of risk on a daily 
basis. Van Gestel and Baesens (2008) identify three main risks of banks: operational risk, 
market risk and credit risk. In terms of the potential amount of losses, they further argue, 
credit risk being the largest of the three. The importance of CRM has been further elaborated 
in many recent studies. Some studies even attribute bad CRM of commercial banks as one of 
the factors for the global financial crisis. For instance, Chaplinska (2012) analyzes Latvian 
commercial banks in a wake of crisis. During this period of time, she observes that volume 
and quality of credit portfolios decrease rapidly. This in her estimation is a result of 
inefficient management of credit risk in Latvian banks. In addition, this credit crunch leads to 
a destabilized economy causing a vicious circle between the banks and a state. When the 
stability of economy is in question, assessment of creditworthiness becomes very difficult for 
banks. One, they are afraid of larger losses in the volatile economy more than in the stable 
economy. Secondly, assessment models of the potential borrowers are harder to identify in 
the bad-performing economy. Essentially, this squeeze in providing loans may cause a credit 
crunch causing economy to be even more destabilized and unpredictable. As a result, 
management of credit distribution and credit risk are as essential for banks as they are for the 
economy of the country. 
Mileris (2012) observes the rise in defaulted rates in 22 EU countries and tries to point out 
causes of such trend. He observes various macroeconomic indicators and confirms a 
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significantly positive relationship between the economic situation in the country and credit 
risk management in banks. Thereinafter he discusses that it is possible to predict the amount 
of the defaulted loans in the future based solely on the macroeconomic measurements. These 
findings signify the role that the economic environment plays in the distribution of 
nonperforming assets in the banking sector. Bearing this in mind, economic state of affairs 
has to be accounted for when conducting research on credit risk management in banks.        
In terms of the overall banking sector, Naceur and Kandil (2009) question regulatory 
incentives by financial institutions and its necessity in the banking sector. The idea of such 
regulations, as these authors argue, is to stabilize both the banking and economic sector. It is 
especially important at times of crisis to prevent large credit losses on the books of banks. 
The authors of this article however argue that too many regulation policies might have the 
adverse impact on the performance of the banking sector. Profitability can be in question as 
high regulations can increase intermediate costs of banks which in turn reduce their 
profitability. In addition, regulations regarding the amount and methods of providing credit to 
borrowers can cause certain banks to be credit constrained. This not only decelerates growth 
of the banking industry but has an undeniable impact on the growth of the entire economy.  
Erdinç and Gurov (2016) conduct their research in a way that corresponds with the 
aforementioned increased regulation in the banking sector. In essence, the first part focuses 
on Basel II regulations and its effect on the amount of non-performing loans. The underlying 
notion is to compare the intensity of implementing IRB (internal-ratings based) in each 
European country and the impact it has had on credit risk management. Their results confirm 
that higher usage of IRB standards directly lead to a decrease in the amount of non-
performing loans in banks. Given these results, it might be suggested that more regulated 
banking sector shall lead to a decrease in default rates and thus better provide control of risk 
in banks. 
3.2 Impact of CRM on profitability of banks 
Conventional notion about credit risk management has changed drastically over the last 
decades. With more papers being focused on CRM, scholars and professionals have 
contributed to the increasing interest from both regulators and banks. One of those 
breakthrough research papers in this topic was Berger‟s (1995) article focusing on the 
relationship between CRM and earnings in the US banking sector in the 1980‟s. At the time 
of writing this paper, the general wisdom was that capital-adequacy ratio, being the proxy for 
16 
 
CRM, leads to lower return on equity. One way to justify this rationale was that CAR reduces 
expected ROE that is required by shareholders by reducing the risk of shareholder‟s equity. 
This and more arguments were in favor of a negative relationship between CAR and ROE. In 
contrast, research done by Berger (1995) showed positive relationship of these two 
measurements, both economically and statistically. His arguments for such different results 
were related to the relaxation of some assumptions in his study. Most notably, the assumption 
of symmetric information along with perfect capital markets was relaxed as well as the one-
period model was changed leading to increased earnings. Relaxing the assumptions of perfect 
capital market and symmetric information reduces the costs, whether it is through lower 
bankruptcy costs in times of financial distress or easier transformation of information about 
banks‟ earnings. Nevertheless, the author himself admits that the results may not hold in the 
future as he (rightfully so) expects more regulated banking sector in the future. In addition, 
his data contained only US banks in a much deregulated banking sector in 1980‟s thus not 
adequately mirroring today‟s situation. 
Turning to European banking sector, paper written by Erdinç and Gurov (2016) proved 
several benefits of a better management of nonperforming loans. Their arguments start 
efficient credit risk management being a significant factor in avoiding the situation of 
banking distress. Due to banks‟ healthy financial position, management can focus its work on 
the operations of banks rather than on solving the financial distress position. The authors then 
argue and empirically that decrease in the amount of nonperforming assets affects 
profitability and solvency of the banking sector in a positive way.  
Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras (2005) also conduct their study on the European market, 
mainly for UK commercial banks. Their focus was not only CRM but also other determinants 
of bank profitability. While capital strength affects banks‟ profits positively, management 
efficiency and bank size produce a negative impact on the profitability of UK banks. Two 
other factors present very mixed results. Firstly, liquidity measurement produces different 
results depending on different profitability indicators. Secondly, the proxy CRM measure 
called loan loss reserve ratio possesses positive effects on net interest margins (NIM) and 
negative impact when comparing against ROAA (return on average assets).   
Naceur and Kandil (2009) studied actions taken by the Central Bank of Egypt to regulate the 
banking sector. More concretely, the specific aim of the paper was to establish a relationship 
between capital regulations and banks‟ performance. In essence, this study confirmed the 
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results of Berger‟s (1995) research in the way that higher CAR positively affects ROA and 
ROE through a higher cost of intermediation. Several other aspects were evaluated to give 
more specific answers behind this relationship. First of all, the bank- specific variables such 
as efficiency of the management, bank size or higher intermediary costs cause bank‟s 
profitability to go down. From the macro perspective, inflation and output growth are among 
the most influential factors of banks‟ stability. The post-regulation period also shows certain 
factors being very positive for banks‟ success, such as increased management efficiency or 
stricter capital requirements. As a result, this study claims a positive effect of regulations in 
the banking sector. 
Another paper with emphasis on the smaller market is a research conducted by Muhamet and 
Arbana (2016). Unlike the preceding paper, their focus is on the European country, namely 
Kosovo. The methodology is organized in a way that corresponds to previous literature. Most 
notably, the ratio of nonperforming loans is used as a primary proxy for credit risk 
management. The second proxy is a risk asset ratio giving the opportunity to compare results 
between the individual measures. The findings of the research are mixed as the collected data 
do not present many observations. Thus each bank in the study presents different results. 
Kurawa and Garba (2014), on the other hand, focused their research on Nigerian banks. 
Besides traditional measures (default rate, and CAR) this study introduces another proxy for 
CRM called cost per loan (CLA). The outcome of the paper provides evidence in the positive 
relationship between CRM and profitability of banks. Another contribution that this paper 
provides is in mapping out recent relevant literature and putting it into perspective. Figure 3 
below presents results of several articles and groups it into four groups. Half of the studies, 
according to Kurawa and Garba (2014), produce negative relationship between credit risk 
measurements and profitability indicators. Essentially, this means a positive relationship 
between credit risk management and performance of banks. Rest of the studies presents 
mixed results, no results, or negative association between CRM and profitability of banks. 
This chart leads one to think there are either gaps in the research methodology or the banking 
sector differs drastically across countries as academics have not been able to come up with 
generalizable findings.   
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Figure 3: The Percentage distribution of outcomes of relevant studies (Kurawa 
& Garba, 2014) 
In this figure, relevant studies on the relationship between CRM and profitability are summarized into a graph. It 
serves for a better comprehension of different results being not conclusive.  
 
 
Based on the previous analysis of the existing relevant literature, it is of highest belief of the 
author of this thesis that CRM topic can be improved upon. First of all, most studies in this 
field have been focusing on USA, Europe, or Africa. European study by Erdinç and Gurov 
(2016) that has been analyzed in depth in previous paragraphs focuses on overall European 
sector. However, it is hard to comprehend that such study can generalize these results across 
all areas of Europe. As was outlined in the background section, the differences of credit risk 
management in different regions are astronomic. Thus the focus of this thesis will be on one 
specific area, more specifically Nordic countries. Hence, a comprehensive dataset along with 
a large sample period allows for contribution to the existing research. 
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4. Methodology  
The following section turns its focus on the methodology that is appropriate for answering the 
research question. First, motives behind data collection are described followed by the 
characterization of the variables that were deemed the most appropriate to answer our 
hypothesis. Last subsection will determine the hypothesis of presented thesis and the 
regression estimation.  
4.1 Data Description 
Data of this study were collected from database called Datastream. They are composed of 13 
commercial banks in four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Bank 
distribution for each country in the sample is provided in figure 4. It is a yearly data in the 
time frame of 2000-2015 which results in total of 186 observations. This time frame was put 
in place to have a sufficient time period to capture the effect of credit risk management for 
the pre- and post- crisis period in Europe (2009). Thus the type of data used for this study is a 
balanced panel dataset. The advantage of it compared to two other types (cross-section, time-
series) has been highlighted by Hsiao (2007). In his paper, the number one benefit of using 
the panel dataset is said to be efficient econometric estimates. This is done because this type 
of dataset allows a researcher to use large amounts of data points which increases the degrees 
of freedom and in turn causes a reduced collinearity between independent variables (Hurlin & 
Venet, 2003). Another advantage compared to cross-section and time-series data sets is that 
panel dataset addresses important questions that other data sets are not capable of doing 
(Hsiao, 2007). 
4.2 Variables 
The data described above have been collected for several variables. These are grouped into 
the three types: dependent, independent, and control variables. Each variable will be carefully 
evaluated and discussed.  
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Figure 4: Bank distribution in the data sample 
This graph represents the distribution of relevant banks in this study‟s sample.  Four countries are given 
a percentage value based on the number of commercial banks being included in the study. Denmark and Sweden 
represent two thirds of the sample. 
 
4.2.1 Proxy Measures of profitability 
The performance of the banking industry has been a large topic discussed in the prior 
research. Recent financial crisis has demonstrated how the banking sector is so important in 
every economy.  As Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2005) point out stability of the 
financial system is dependent on the banking sector that is profitable, which applies 
especially during periods of negative shocks. Thus it is obvious that there exist many 
stakeholders (academics, investors. etc.) interested in the performance of banks. Most of the 
academics use the same two proxy indicators for bank performance- return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE). Adefeya et al. (2015) define ROA as a measure of utilizing the 
bank‟s assets to generate profit. They argue transactions that are not included on balance 
sheet may cause bias of this measure. On the flipside, their definition of ROE quantifies 
profits made by shareholders given how much equity was invested in a bank (Adefeya et al., 
2015). It has been shown that operating asset ratio such as ROA is higher if a bank chooses a 
higher equity structure (low leverage level). Operating equity ratios (ROE), on the other 
hand, perform worse with such debt structure in banks. This can be explained by ROE not 
taking into account the amount of risk associated with leverage. Thus ROA is considered as 
the most informative indicator for bank profitability (IMF, 2002). This statement is backed 
off by Hassan and Bashir (2003) who go as far as stating that ROA is preferred by most 
regulators. ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets, reflecting bank‟s 
ability to generate profits given the amount of assets they possess. ROE will be calculated by 
21 
 
dividing earnings by total equity, showing to shareholders how much income the bank 
generates on their equity. 
4.2.2 Proxy Measures of credit risk management 
Due to the unavailability of data and different methods preferred, researchers use a variety of 
independent variables to measure credit risk. The most accurate measure and also most 
widely used across articles has been NPLR (non-performing loans ratio). Its accuracy rests in 
a direct incorporation of loan losses. More than that, it indicates how effective the 
management is in managing credit risk in banks because it determines the ratio of loans that 
have defaulted or are close to being default to the total loans. In addition, Noman, Pervin and 
Chowdhury (2015) emphasize that lower NPL ratio is the evidence of lower amount of loans 
being doubtful which in turn means a lower credit risk. This signifies the importance of 
NPLR as a CRM proxy.  
In case of unavailability of data for nonperforming loans, researchers use a proxy indicator 
for measuring the default rate. Altunbas and Marques (2008) confirm this notion by 
concluding that several European countries do not provide information on non-performing 
loans. In their paper, a possible proxy to use as a measure for the estimation of credit risk is 
the loan loss provision compared to total loans, or loan loss provision ratio (LLPR).  It is the 
provision that is set aside in case of defaulted or uncollected loans. In other words, provision 
represents the reserved amount of money that the bank assumes is going to lose on bad loans 
which in turn accurately assesses the financial position of the bank. The intent of the thesis 
was to use non-performing loans as a credit risk management proxy measure. However, due 
to the unavailability of data for this variable, loan loss provision ratio is used instead. As 
Podpiera and Weill (2007) point out it might be that LLPR is less relevant due to the fact that 
bank‟s management has influence on loan loss reserves. On the other hand, other researchers 
such as Rossi, Schwaiger and Winkler (2015) find significance of using such measure in 
terms of management‟s performance. Whether LLPR is relevant or not will be estimated in 
the empirical results section. The calculation of this ratio is will be calculated by dividing a 
loan loss provisions by the total amount of loans. 
Another measure frequently used in many research papers is capital adequacy ratio (CAR). 
Noman, Pervin and Chowdhury (2015) motivate its use as a credit risk indicator in the sense 
that higher CAR indicates higher asset quality which in turn means lower credit risk for a 
bank. Another reason CAR is used as a proxy for credit risk management is Bhavani and 
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Bhanumurthy (2012) define it as one of the two measures (along with NPLR) to determine 
the soundness of the banking system. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) puts regulations on 
capital requirement and it is a ratio of (tier 1+ tier 2) capital to the percentage of risk- 
weighted- assets (RWA). This calculation is based on the previous literature and is mandatory 
due to Basel regulations. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras (2005) identify two kinds of influences on bank profitability; 
internal and external. They further describe external factors as being the ones that 
management has no control over, e.g. economic growth, inflation, interest rates, etc. They 
distinguish internal factors as being the ones that management can control, for instance 
liquidity and capital adequacy, so the ones that can be directly impacted by management‟s 
action. Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras (2005) conclude that although internal factors 
explain banks‟ profitability almost fully, external factors also contribute to the influence on 
profitability as well. 
Bank specific factors 
Notwithstanding credit risk, several authors agree on certain bank- specific aspects that affect 
profitability. Significance of efficiency of management, capital strength, and size of banks is 
supported by several studies (Staikouras & Wood, 2011; Kosmidou et al. 2005; Petria, 
Capraru and Ihnatov, 2015). Cost per loan or (CLA) has been used mostly as an indicator of 
the efficiency with which management distributes its loans to borrowers. For instance, 
Kolapo, Ayeni and Oke (2012) find significance of using this ratio (CLA) as a CRM proxy as 
it highlights how efficient the banks are in loan distribution to customers. More importantly, 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2005) discuss that although there are various costs when 
it comes to banks, only type of costs- operating expenses, are a true indicator of 
management‟s actions. It will be calculated as a ratio of operating expenses divided by total 
amount of loans and its expected sign is negative. Capital strength, as one of the 
aforementioned factors, is already included in the regression under capital adequacy ratio. 
Therefore, there is no need to control for capital strength of banks twice. As of bank size 
factor, most studies use a logarithm of banks‟ total assets. As the relationship has proven to 
be significant across several articles, the log of total assets will be included as a control 
variable. Based on other research papers, the expected relationship of bank size with 
performance measures is positive.  
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Macroeconomic Factors 
In relation to external factors, Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras (2005) evaluate small impact 
of such variables on banks‟ performance. This supports the results from the previous relevant 
literature in the sense that internal factors are more explanatory in explaining bank 
performance. However, some macroeconomic variables are still significant in relation to 
banks‟ profitability. Most of them vary study by study but most of studies such as Staikouras 
and Wood, (2011), Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras (2005), Petria, Capraru and Ihnatov 
(2015) have one variable that is significant in common. That variable is real GDP annual 
growth rate of the economy. So as research is pretty consistent with this one, it will be used 
as a macroeconomic control variable. It is expected that GDP variable will have a positive 
effect on profitability. All variables, their calculation and expected sign in the regression are 
summarized in the table 4 below. This serves as a better overall view on what to expect from 
the analysis of this thesis. 
Table 4: Variables and Expected signs 
This table summarizes each variable used in this thesis. It also highlights calculation and the expected sign for 
the regression results of each variable.  
 
 Variable Name Calculation Method Expected Sign 
Dependent 
Variables 
ROE Net Income/Total 
Equity 
 
ROA Net Income/ Total 
Assets 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
LLPR Loan Loss Provision/ 
Total Loans 
- 
CAR Total Capital/ Risk 
Weighted Assets 
+ 
 
Control Variables 
(bank- specific) 
Cost per Loan Total Operating 
Cost/ Total Loans 
- 
Bank Size Log Total Assets + 
Control Variable 
(macroeconomic) 
GDP Growth (real) % annual change + 
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4.3 Regression Analysis 
Now that all the variables have been explained and analyzed thoroughly, the hypotheses of 
this study can be presented. There are four separate hypotheses due to the inclusion of 2 
dependent variables. First pair of hypothesis will test if credit risk management positively 
affects profitability of Nordic commercial banks. Following the results of relevant research, 
the expectations are that this relationship is positive. The question will be how strong the 
relationship is and whether it is negligible compared to, for instance, economic factors. 
Second pair of hypothesis will be related to global financial crisis more specifically the focus 
will be on the year 2009. As Erdinç and Gurov (2016) pointed out, the Eurozone crisis 
covered the period from 2009 to 2011. Considering the data at hand, there is a considerable 
amount of data for both the pre and post- crisis period. Thus the sample will be divided into 
two sub-periods: pre-crisis (pre- 2009) and post-crisis (post-2009). This method gives an 
opportunity to evaluate the impact of crisis on the CRM impact. The expectations of this 
hypothesis are hard to predict as no other study has done similar research. Nevertheless, the 
expectations are that the relationship between CRM and profitability has grown in strength 
post-crisis. 
In order to test the hypothesis with the (dependent and independent) variables analyzed in 
previous sections, regression has to be structured to statistically prove any relationship 
between variables. Since this study uses variety of variables across many years in time, there 
will be three panel data methods used: pooled regression, fixed effect and random effect. First 
off, the regression equation will be written as following: 
Yit = α + ∑ βn Xnit + εit 
Where: 
yit – the dependent variable 
xnit - independent variables 
α - the intercept 
Βn - coefficients of the regressors 
εit - the residuals 
Subscript „i‟ represents cross- sectional unit i= 1, 2.., N, while subscript “t” denotes time 
periods with t=1, 2...T (Baltagi, 2011). 
First option, as outlined in previous paragraphs, of estimating the panel data is a pooled 
regression. The idea is to pool all 186 observations and run the regression model neglecting 
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the cross- section and time series nature of data. Although the technique is quite 
straightforward, it brings a major downside with it.  The problem with this model is that it 
does not distinguish between the various banks thus denying the heterogeneity that may and 
should exist among them. According to Forssbæck (2015), there are two different types of 
models with error components that allow for cross- sectional heterogeneity: random effects 
model and fixed effects model.   
The fixed effects model allows each cross-sectional unit to have a different intercept while at 
the same time it is time invariant, meaning it does not vary over time. On the other hand, 
random effects model, or the error components model, uses different intercepts for each 
cross- sectional unit and they are time invariant, which is the same as in the fixed effects 
model. However, the difference is that in the random effects model, all these intercepts for 
different units have a common mean value that they arise from (Brooks, 2014). 
In order to determine whether to use the random or the fixed effects model, the Hausman- 
Test is in disposal. Hausman- Test, among other things, tests the validity of the random 
effects model thus showing if performing the fixed effects model instead is necessary 
(Brooks, 2014). Thus Hausman- Test provides a statistically significant P- value, the fixed-
effects model shall be used, otherwise the random- effects model will be used. By analyzing 
relevant literature it is possible to highlight further tests which have to be accounted for. 
Multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity in particular have been present in some studies and 
are advised by authors to be aware of them. 
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5. Empirical Results 
This section is organized into four main blocks beginning with the simple descriptive 
statistics. These are organized in a way to highlight changes of variables from pre- to post-
crisis, which then serves as a basis for the further analysis. Next subsection is dedicated to 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity tests to ensure the data do not violate assumptions of 
OLS. Afterwards, main regression results are presented and analyzed in depth as to discuss 
the individual effects of variables as well as evaluate comparisons of results to those from 
other relevant studies. To end this section, the data sample is divided into two sub-periods to 
analyze how financial crisis has changed this relationship between CRM and profitability of 
Nordic commercial banks. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The following section addresses situation in the banking industry and how it has changed 
since the financial crisis. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics to highlight the biggest 
changes from pre- to post- crisis period. With results at hand, there are few points to be 
addressed. First point is in relation to differences in the banking sector performance from pre-
crisis to a post-crisis period. Unsurprisingly, Nordic commercial banks have experienced 
lower profitability since 2009. The reasons can be decomposed into few points. On one hand, 
recession in these economies leads consumers to be more cautious towards taking on more 
debt which in turn pushes banks to lower interest rates in order to make up for losses. Since 
lending credit is such a crucial part of banks‟ business models, credit crunch may be one of 
the reasons for worse performance of banks. Furthermore, as outlined in the second section, 
regulatory pressures forced banks to be more cautious of capital reserves which can be 
another factor in profitability decrease.  
Another reason can be found when evaluating the trend of other measures. Looking at LLPR 
first, the increase in the ratio is evident although the percentage value is still below 1%. This 
comes as no surprise as the second section described Nordic market being the one with the 
lowest default rates. What is more worrisome is the trend of capital adequacy ratio. Its 
percentage value has more than doubled from 7.5% before 2009 to more than 15% after 
2009. Minimal regulatory requirements for this measure are at 8% making an average 15% 
value almost a twice of what is required. The motives for such conservative approach may be 
dedicated to regulatory pressures by financial institutions. Even more so, precautionary 
27 
 
measures by managers keeping higher capital on their books rather than investing in risky 
assets may have had something to do with a decreased profitability which will be later 
supported or rejected by more elaborate analysis. Management efficiency in terms of cost per 
loan has stayed stable while macroeconomic factors have changed rapidly. GDP growth 
before crisis had a mean value of 2.4% while in the after-crisis period it was less than 1%. 
Whether more damage on profitability was done by credit risk management or 
macroeconomic factors will be evaluated in the following sections. 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows regression results performed for 2 dependent and several independent variables. It also 
presents values for two sub-periods (before and after crisis).  Mean value and standard deviations are 
highlighted for each independent variable.  
 
 Pre-crisis  Post-crisis  
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
ROA 0.017 0.006 0.011 0.009 
ROE 0.127 0.071 0.068 0.081 
LLPR 0.0014 0.0025 0.0072 0.0125 
CAR 0.075 0.062 0.154 0.057 
Cost per Loan 0.055 0.029 0.051 0.031 
Bank Size 7.44 0.987 7.55 1.02 
GDP growth 0.024 0.016 0.007 0.027 
 
5.2 Multicollinearity and Heteroscedasticity 
In order to be fully certain of the regression model, few tests have to be run. One of the OLS 
assumptions is the variance of errors being constant. This assumption is also known as 
homoscedasticity. If this requirement to run OLS is violated, the data supposedly contains 
heteroscedastic variables. To ensure this is not the case, several methods can be applied to 
test this assumption. Breusch- Pagan test was selected as appropriate due to the smaller size 
of the sample. The results for both dependent variables (ROA, ROE) are presented in the 
appendix section. As can be concluded, values for both ROA (0.16) and for ROE (0.99) are 
not significant and thus the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected. In other 
words, there is no heteroscedasticity presented in the data. 
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It is also necessary to test if the independent variables are close to being linearly dependent. 
This assumption is called multicollinearity. First, the correlation matrix is constructed where 
the final table is presented in appendix. The minimum value of correlation to be causing 
multicollinearity is 0.8. Since each correlation is lower than 0.8 there should be no 
multicollinearity in the study. However, a test to check these results was used called variance 
inflation factor, also known as VIF. Table A2 in the appendix section shows that the values of 
VIF are in a range from 1.12 to 2.38. This supports the findings from the correlation matrix as 
no value exceeds 10 meaning multicollinearity is not present.  
5.3 Regression Results 
As described in the preceding chapters, the OLS estimation is the primary method to estimate 
the effect of credit risk on profitability of Nordic commercial banks. To ensure the right 
version of OLS is used, pooled regression, random effects and fixed effects are all run in 
Stata. To decide which of the tests is the most suited for this type of data the Hausman test is 
run in Stata to choose between random and fixed effects. Tests have to be again run for both 
dependent variables: ROA, ROE. The results, as presented in the appendix section, differ for 
these two variables. Running the test with ROA as an explained variable, the null hypothesis 
is rejected with the p-value being 0.048. Consequently, fixed effects model shall be used for 
this model. On the other hand, the p-value with the ROE being the dependent variable is 
0.527 which presents no significance and as a result the random- effects is chosen for this 
regression.  
Now that every test has been checked for and fixed, respectively random effects model has 
been established as the most appropriate, the results can now be presented. Table 6 below 
highlights the regression results for both dependent variables: ROA, ROE. Looking at the 
significance of results, all independent variables but GDP growth and bank size present 
significant results. And of those 4, only CAR is significant at 10% level with other 3 being 
significant at 5% level. As expected, results of relationship between LLPR and measurements 
of performance are negative and significant in both models proving that higher provisions for 
loan losses cause profitability to decrease. This in turn means that sound CRM directly leads 
to a higher profitability of banks. More concretely, one unit increase in LLPR causes ROA to 
decrease by 0.68 units and ROE to a reduction of 7.35 units. Being a proxy for 
nonperforming loans ratio, the results are in accordance with most of the previous literature. 
For instance, Noman, Pervin and Chowdhury (2015) found the same negative relationship 
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between NPL and ROA, and NPL and ROA. In terms of strength of the relationship, LLPR 
seems to have a higher impact on performance measures than NPL when compared to other 
studies. 
Second proxy for CRM called capital adequacy ratio shows mixed results when it comes to 
different independent variables. First, CAR is found to have positive and significant (at 10% 
level) effect on ROA. More specifically, one unit increase in capital adequacy ratio leads to a 
0.013 increase in ROA. This is in accordance with the study of Kosmidou, Tanna and 
Pasiouras (2005) who find a positive relationship between CAR and ROA. On the other hand, 
different scenario has appeared when using ROE as a dependent variable. The relationship 
between CAR and ROE is proven to be negative and significant (at 5% level). More 
concretely, one unit increase in CAR causes ROE to decrease by 0.119 units. This may seem 
as a contradictory result as both ROA and ROE represent profitability of banks. At the same 
time, as mentioned in the literature review section, results for this specific relationship are 
contradicting. While Berger (1995) found a positive relationship between CAR and ROE, 
Noman, Pervin and Chowdhury (2015) prove a negative relationship between these two 
variables. Berger (1995) addressed this possibility already in his study as his take on 
sustainability of his results was fairly skeptical due to his anticipation of more regulated 
banking sector in the future. In other words, our results may not be contradicting after all. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the effect of CAR is different when comparing to ROA 
and ROE.  
The intuition behind these findings can be decomposed into several arguments. First, higher 
capital adequacy ratio makes banks more capital constrained which in turn squeezes the room 
for management to operate. In essence, their investment opportunities and decisions are then 
affected making a chance to adequately invest capital much smaller. Secondly, these findings 
can be an indication of Nordic commercial banks being heavily dependent on equity capital 
as their primary source of funding. As a result management may be too constrained while it 
cannot profitably use equity with the higher capital ratios being forced by Basel regulations. 
More importantly, higher regulations may force management of banks being more 
conservative and risk averse in their decision- making. All these factors may have contributed 
to our results of CAR being negatively associated with ROE. Nevertheless the true reasons 
are out of scope of this thesis. 
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Focusing on the remaining variables, bank size is significant only in the model with ROA and 
estimates a negative relationship with the performance measure. Although some researchers 
estimated such relationship to be positive, the likes of Naceur and Kandil (2009) proved the 
negative impact. At the same time, our results produce a very small coefficient value showing 
not much impact on profitability. More surprisingly, cost per loan ratio is found to have 
positive effect on the performance of banks. This seems as a surprising finding as it would 
indicate that higher costs would lead to higher profitability. Looking at data however, this 
ratio was stable at around 5% for the entire 16 year sample period. Thus the explanation can 
be that the data for CLA only changed marginally. GDP growth, on the other hand 
significantly and positively affects ROE as was expected. Furthermore, the overall satisfying 
fit measured by R squared shows that 42% of data explaining the relationship with ROA, 
while 65% with ROE. Compared to other studies, our overall satisfying fit is well above 
average. For instance Berger‟s (1995) study of CAR relationship on ROE has a 23 % fit of 
data while the research by Noman, Pervin and Chowdhury (2015) presents even worse fit 
with only 20%.Therefore, the choice of variables for our thesis seems to be more adequate 
than the previous studies. 
 
Table 6: Regression Results 
This table shows regression results performed for 2 dependent and several independent variables.  First number 
represents the values of the coefficients while second value presented in parentheses represents standard errors 
of coefficients. Values of R squared are presented to identify overall satisfying fit of the data.     
   
Dependent Variables ROA ROE 
LLPR -0.686** 
(0.070) 
-7.352** 
(0.567) 
CAR 0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.119** 
(0.054) 
CLA 0.075** 
(0.023) 
0.408** 
(0.185) 
Bank Size -0.007** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
GDP Growth -0.009 
(0.015) 
0.304** 
(0.136) 
Constant 0.066** 
(0.018) 
0.119** 
(0.053) 
R
2 0.42 0.65 
* (**) = significant at 10% (5%) level 
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5.4 Pre- vs. post- crisis comparison  
Previous section highlighted the relationship between CRM and banks‟ performance of 
Nordic commercial banks. Now the focus turns to differences in this relationship in the 
respect to pre- crisis and post-crisis period. The results for both dependent variables are 
summarized in table 7. LLPR is significant in all four instances at the 5% significance level. 
In line with previous results and our expectations, there is a negative sign of LLPR across 
both models. On the other hand, the relationship in both instances becomes “less negative”, 
thus the negative effect begins to lose on strength. This may indicate that banks have become 
more efficient at dealing with defaulted loans. The amount of provisions set aside compared 
to total loans has increased post-crisis as previously highlighted in table 5. In other words, it 
is hard to attribute these results to a better management of defaulted loans. Looking at CAR, 
all values are positive but only two of them are significant at the 10% level. Nevertheless it 
seems as if CAR had the more stable relationship with profitability measures than LLPR.  In 
addition, looking at the post- crisis results alone, CAR seems to have a very little effect on 
both profitability measures. Unsurprisingly, macroeconomic situation in Nordic countries 
may have had a large impact on the decreasing profitability post-crisis. GDP growth already 
showed us in the descriptive statistics section how it decreased in the post-2009 period. 
Although not having all coefficients significant, the change in direction of the relationship 
between GDP growth and profitability of banks is obvious. Most notably, its relationship 
with ROE has worsened where the relationship reverted from being positive to negative 
(although post-crisis CAR being insignificant). There is thus suspicion that GDP growth may 
become more influential in determining profitability of banks after the financial crisis. These 
arguments cannot be conclusive due to the insignificance of certain coefficients.  
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Table 7: Regression Results 
This table shows regression results performed for 2 dependent and several independent variables. It also 
presents values for two sub-periods (before and after crisis).  First number represents the values of the 
coefficients while second value presented in parentheses represents standard errors of coefficients. Values of R 
squared are presented to identify overall satisfying fit of the data.     
 
Regression Results 
Dependent 
variables 
ROA 
Pre-crisis                    Post-crisis 
ROE 
Pre-crisis                    Post-crisis 
LLPR -1.123** 
(0.291) 
-0.598** 
(0.077) 
-9.401** 
(1.948) 
-5.498** 
(0.823) 
CAR 0.015 
(0.009) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.126* 
(0.066) 
0.008 
(0.103) 
Cost per Loan 0.070** 
(0.035) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
0.342 
(0.157) 
-0.246 
(0.353) 
Bank Size 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
GDP Growth -0.022 
(0.037) 
-0.032** 
(0.014) 
0.984** 
(0.253) 
-0.234 
(0.153) 
Constant 0.010 
(0.008) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.023 
(0.057) 
0.069 
(0.061) 
R2 0.65 0.74 0.41 0.73 
* (**) = significant at 10% (5%) level 
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6. Conclusion  
The aim of this thesis was to determine the relationship between credit risk management and 
performance of Nordic commercial banks. Based on our results, it can be concluded that 
credit risk management affects performance of Nordic commercial banks. Nevertheless, 
direction and significance of this relationship were mixed depending on the CRM proxy used. 
The methods of arriving to the successful results were twofold. Firstly, the study showed 
mixed results as two independent variables for the measurement of credit risk were used. In 
particular, loan loss provision ratio was found negative and significant for both return on 
assets and return on equity. It is worth to note that relationship with return on equity was 
stronger. Capital adequacy ratio, on the other hand, differed in results depending on the 
chosen dependent variable. The effect of CAR on return on assets was positive as other 
studies have also shown. As estimates on return on equity have varied through the studies, it 
cannot be concluded that the negative association between CAR and ROE is in accordance to 
general results. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that credit risk management has significant 
influence on the profitability of Nordic commercial banks. 
Further analysis focused on the Eurozone crisis and its impact on credit risk management. 
The sample was divided into two subsamples for a pre- and post- crisis period.  The biggest 
finding was that the relationship between loan loss provisions and profitability measures has 
lost in power after the wake of crisis. Nevertheless, the negative and significant impact was 
still obvious even in the recession period. As outlined in the descriptive statistics section, 
profitability of banks has decreased since 2009. In fact, from our regression results it seems 
as if GDP growth has grown in strength in terms of explaining the dump in profitability 
measures. Before the crisis arrived, the relationship between GDP growth and ROE was 
highly positive and significant. This relationship is however different after 2009 as there is a 
negative and insignificant effect of economic growth in countries on banks‟ ROE.  
One of the drawbacks of this study is inability to access data for NPL which has been the 
most used proxy for CRM in other studies. While LLPR and CAR serve as very approximate 
indicators of credit risk, it would be of great advantage to include NPL as well and compare 
results with other articles and variables. It is then recommended for any future study focusing 
on this topic to use NPL as another independent variable. Using NPLR or not, there is a 
problem arising with using NPLR or LLPR as a proxy for credit risk management. Its 
usability can be skewed as it is a subject to managerial manipulation which in turn can cause 
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these proxies to misleading based on managements‟ will (Niinimaki, 2012). It can be done by 
either postponing the loan maturity or creating a new loan. Therefore there is still a 
possibility that LLPR may not be the exact proxy for CRM. Further research could also look 
at the possibility of a comparative study between different areas of Europe due to the 
disparity of non-performing loans across the Old Continent. Last but not least, including 
more data post- crisis would be beneficial to show a whole picture of the impact of the crisis 
on this issue. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Breusch Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
This table summarizes results performed for both dependent variables. Second row presents the chi square value 
while the third table shows pi- value of coefficients. 
 
 ROA ROE 
Chi2 1.96 0.00 
p- value 0.1617 0.9958 
 
 
 
Table A2: Correlation matrix of coefficients 
This table summarizes all independent variables and their respective values for correlation of coefficients. 
 LLPR CAR CLA Bank Size GDP Growth 
LLPR 1.00     
CAR -0.33 1.00    
CLA -0.51 0.43 1.00   
Bank Size 0.47 -0.28 -0.51 1.00  
GDP Growth 0.19 0.11 0.001 -0.01 1.00 
 
 
Table A3: Test for multicollinearity 
This table summarizes all independent variables and their respective values of variance inflation factors (VIF).  
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CLA 2.38 0.420466 
LLPR 2.25 0.445350 
Bank Size 1.37 0.727994 
CAR 1.26 0.793765 
GDP 1.12 0.891799 
Mean VIF 1.68  
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Hausman Test 
This table summarizes Hausman Test results to decide whether random or fixed effects model shall be used. Chi 
square values and p- values of coefficients are presented for both dependent variables. 
 
 ROA ROE 
Chi2 11.16 4.16 
p- value 0.0483 0.5270 
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Table A5: Pooled Regression, Fixed Effects, Random Effects for ROA 
Coefficient values and their respective p-values are presented for all independent variables. Three tests are 
provided for the dependent variable (ROA): pooled regression, fixed effects, and random effects. 
 
 
 Pooled Regression Fixed Effects Random Effects 
ROA Coeff. p- value Coeff. p- value Coeff. p- value 
LLPR -0.745 0.000 -0.685 0.000 -0.767 0.000 
CAR 0.008 0.240 0.013 0.064 0.004 0.458 
CLA 0.047 0.027 0.075 0.002 0.070 0.001 
Bank Size 0.000 0.337 -0.007 0.005 -0.000 0.550 
GDP 0.003 0.885 -0.009 0.546 -0.001 0.972 
Constant 0.011 0.002 0.066 0.001 0.016 0.002 
 
 
Table A6: Pooled Regression, Fixed Effects, Random Effects for ROE 
Coefficient values and their respective p-values are presented for all independent variables. Three tests are 
provided for the dependent variable (ROE): pooled regression, fixed effects, and random effects. 
 
 
 Pooled Regression Fixed Effects Random Effects 
ROE Coeff. p- value Coeff. p- value Coeff. p- value 
LLPR -6.886 0.000 -7.454 0.000 -7.352 0.000 
CAR -0.105 0.077 -0.071 0.266 -0.119 0.027 
CLA 0.427 0.016 0.272 0.201 0.408 0.028 
Bank Size 0.086 0.204 -0.035 0.125 0.001 0.850 
GDP 0.351 0.021 0.219 0.129 0.304 0.025 
Constant 0.086 0.002 0.397 0.021 0.119 0.206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
